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Abstract 
Globalisation has become a catch-all term imbuing public discussions with a sense of urgency 
about something that often cannot even be properly identified. This literature review presents an 
outline of arguments about what globalisation actually can mean, how to measure it and how to 
face it.  
Large parts of the world have seen an explosion in trade, cross-border investment flows and 
innovation transfers in recent years. Quantitatively, this can be captured in the appropriate 
statistics. On the other hand, in trying to understand the drivers of these changes, it is necessary 
to describe the changing institutions and actors that play a significant role in this process. Some 
authors point to the role of the multinational enterprise as a uniquely defining feature of 
globalisation. 
It is difficult to disentangle the effect of globalisation from the evolution of the most-developed 
economies towards a ‘post-industrial’ mode of operation. On top of this, countries are 
increasingly affected by endogenous social changes such as the diminished role of the nuclear 
family and population ageing (resulting from falling birth rates and rising longevity). 
Policy-makers face demands to help citizens cope with the risks arising out of this new state of 
affairs. In addition to describing globalisation, this paper provides an overview of the possible 
responses. In particular, it focuses on the growing body of literature that seeks to re-focus the 
attention on social protection as a ‘productive factor’ and as something that should be seen as 
part of the larger framework of ‘social risk management’. The latter concept stresses the need to 
look at social protection as only one component of a larger framework, which contains 
macroeconomic conditions as well as various state, market and individual tools for managing 
personal risks. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalisation became the buzzword of 1990s. The Iron Curtain had just fallen and governments 
around the world embraced market-based mechanisms more strongly than ever. The 
liberalisation of trade, investments and financial flows proceeded apace towards the creation of 
one global marketplace. Today, a foreign-exchange dealer in a bank somewhere in Europe 
follows the movements of currencies in Asia just as closely as the ones in and around Europe. 
Products are made where it is cheapest to make them. For example, three-fifths of all clothing 
buttons used in the world are actually produced in one region in China.
1 
By the 2000s, the word ‘anti-globalisation’ had crept into the public debate,
2 and discussions 
about the merits and drawbacks of globalisation have since become the norm. 
International organisations have duly responded with studies on globalisation and its impact on 
the social sphere. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
organised a research programme on “Empowering People to Meet the Challenges of 
Globalisation”. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) established the World Commission 
on Globalisation. The World Bank published its report on Poverty in an Age of Globalisation 
(2000) and other studies. 
Surprisingly little has been done, however, in terms of an analysis of globalisation and its 
impact on the European social sphere. That is something ENEPRI’s project on the Social Impact 
of Globalisation in the EU (SIMGLOBE), of which this paper is a part, intends to partially 
remedy.  
 
                                                      
1 More specifically, they are produced in and around one town, Qiaotou (“The tiger’s teeth”, The 
Guardian, 25 May 2005). 
2 Stan Fischer (2003, p. 2, fn 2) describes the rise of ‘globalisation’ and ‘anti-globalisation’ as follows:  
During the 1970’s the word ‘globalization’ was never mentioned in the pages of The New 
York Times. In the 1980’s the word cropped up less than once a week; in the first half of the 
1990’s, less than twice a week; and in the latter half of the decade, no more than three times 
a week. In 2000 there were 514 stories in the paper that made reference to ‘globalization’; 
there were 364 stories in 2001, and 393 references in 2002. Based on stories in The New 
York Times, the idea of being ‘anti-globalization’ was not one that existed before about 
1999. Turning from the newspaper to the internet, ‘globalization’ brings up 1.6 million 
links through the use of the Google search engine, and typing in ‘anti-globalization’ brings 
up 80,000 links. 2 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
Yet there has been an increasing recognition in analytical and policy-related documents of the 
need to adjust labour market and social protection policies to the perceived demand for 
‘flexibilisation’ in today’s marketplace. On the one hand, proponents of the ‘Eurosclerosis’ 
thesis have advocated a radical scale-down of existing welfare-state mechanisms. On the other 
hand, many commentators have drawn attention to the efficiency function of social protection. 
The European Commission published a study on The Costs of Non-Social Policy (Begg et al., 
2004). It has also adopted, for some documents, the concept of transitional labour markets, 
recognising the need to help individuals manage transitions across the life course, in a world of 
increasingly differentiated life-course profiles. And the World Bank introduced a new 
conceptual framework for social risk management (Holzmann & Jorgensen, 2000). This 
framework aims at promoting a positive, individual-empowering notion of social protection, and 
breaks with the narrow view of social risks as something to be managed by public redistribution 
and service production. 
This literature review sums up the challenges to the different variants of the European social 
model (ESM). It starts with a survey of the meanings of globalisation. While not offering one 
definition of globalisation, it sketches out ways of conceptualising and measuring the 
phenomenon. A brief survey of theoretical arguments relating to social protection and social risk 
management follows. The wider linkages between trade, investments and financial flows, the 
production and dissemination of innovation, and individual welfare are described next. Finally, 
the last section sums up the social protection challenges that lie ahead of us in Europe.  
2. Globalisation 
2.1 History 
In 1962, Marshall McLuhan first brought out the term ‘global’ as something denoting a tectonic 
shift in social relations into the public domain in his book The Gutenberg Galaxy. The term was 
more ‘cultural’ in content than anything else. The concept of a ‘global village’ describes broad 
changing patterns in human perceptions of time and space. Indeed, communication technologies 
and commercial developments have by now created a certain global, common cultural code. 
Two people from different parts of the globe can easily discuss their favourite Hollywood 
movies, analyse the politics of some of those military conflicts that are heavily covered by news 
agencies or comment on the contents of some globally-disseminated lifestyle platform, as in the 
magazine Cosmopolitan for example.  
‘Globalisation’ has, however, increasingly come to be referred to in connection with economic 
challenges (see the discussion in Box 1). References are often negative, as when newspaper 
headlines describe anti-globalist protesters spoiling international gatherings or anti-globalisation 
feelings running against the European Constitution (Giddens, 2005, p. 97).  
Globalisation in this sense denotes the processes of pressure on labour markets to become more 
flexible and wages to adjust to the rate dictated by the global market. Producers compete not 
just with other producers in the same country or region but increasingly with almost anyone 
across the globe, as new technology makes transportation much less of a cost and 
communication much easier. GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE | 3 
 
Box 1. Globalisation – The history of a free-floating signifier 
In 1962 Marshall McLuhan published his Gutenberg Galaxy, in which he coined the idea of a ‘global 
village’, pointing out that satellite communications is creating a certain universal, radically new culture. It 
was at this point that the world began to be sensitised to the adjective ‘global’ as describing a profound 
change of the environment we live in, associated vaguely with a reorganisation of distance and time.  
In the 1970s there was an explosion in cross-border financial flows. This development stemmed from 
various interrelated reasons – the infusion of dollars by the US into the world financial markets in an 
effort to pay, simultaneously, for its welfare state expansion and the Vietnam war; the parallel ‘non-
regulation’ by the UK government of the market in Eurodollars; the end of Bretton Woods; and the 
growth of the Eurodollar market in the wake of the oil crisis as large volumes of petrodollars started 
circulating in the system. With the rise in volume of the extra-national financial markets and the currency 
exchange volatilities introduced by the end of Bretton Woods, there was a critical mass established for the 
financial institutions to develop ever-more sophisticated instruments. These helped to a) address the 
demand for risk management (through financial derivatives) and b) further escape the regulatory 
framework of states (especially during the period when they were engaging in deflationary policies, such 
as during the US Federal Reserve Board’s policies in 1979-82, at the beginning of Paul Volcker’s 
chairmanship).  
It was during this period that the key component of what we view today as globalisation came into 
being – the existence of financial flows seemingly autonomous of state power, circling the globe in 
search of profits. 
In the 1980s, this tendency was strongly reinforced by the implementation of technological advances 
(Reuters introduced its vastly enhanced platform for real time worldwide dealing in currencies) and 
government policies (the massive US exports of dollars through trade deficits). Furthermore, the world 
started talking decisively about trading blocs. The Single European Market was established, followed by 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the next decade. 
The 1990s saw, crucially, the erosion of the Westphalian system – that is, the notion in international law 
established by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) of total separation of international and intra-state laws, 
whereby states are creators of their respective legal systems and other states should fully respect their 
sovereignty. Of course, the rise of intergovernmental organisations, such as the United Nations, had been 
prominent throughout the 20
th century, as has been the increasing number of cross-national agreements 
(e.g. the Charter of Human Rights and the Helsinki accords), each constraining national sovereignty. In 
the 1990s, however, the idea that humanitarian and human rights concerns are above state sovereignty 
(Taylor, 2001) found expression in the growing acceptance of ‘humanitarian interventions’ (Somalia, 
Bosnia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, etc.) and in cases such as the extradition proceedings for General Augusto 
Pinochet, the establishment of the International Criminal Court and so on.  
The decade also witnessed the rise of two different sets of concerns about globalisation. On the one hand, 
there was a notable homogenisation of ‘culture’ and tastes as consumers all around the globe were 
exposed to Hollywood movies, ate at McDonald’s and so forth. This component of globalisation is the 
one that often echoes ‘Americanisation’. On the other hand, globalisation came to be equated with the 
role of world capital versus the perceived decreasing power of states or democratic politics (or both). 
Globalisation here means hire-and-fire policies, job insecurity, the ‘robbing of the common man’ through 
those highly complicated mechanisms of transfer pricing, vehicle firms and tax havens, which for many 
epitomise the ‘ugly’ side of globalisation. It increased material well-being for many, but introduced an 
uncomfortably fast pace of change, creating a ‘runaway world’ (Giddens, 2002). These are the facets of 
globalisation reviled by the activists who swarmed Seattle during the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
1999 and later took up other occasions to force a standoff with the institutions of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’.  4 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
Of course, this is also the decade when the WTO was established and world trade reached a new level of 
liberalisation and intensity.   
So, globalisation has many facets. For many, it means that global standards have become more reliable 
than local ones – as for example an increasing number of people go to Starbucks as a recognised 
international standard rather than to a local coffee shop. Some would say globalisation means pronounced 
core-periphery effects in the international economy.  
We can argue that it means that the state acts more as an upholder of a certain framework of globalisation 
rather than the paternalistic entity of the earlier eras. The more effectively a state is capable of exercising 
soft, structural power (Strange, 1994), meaning influencing international frameworks and the rules of the 
game rather than extracting gains bilaterally, or the more it is capable of individual-empowering, ‘input-
based policies’ (universal education and training for a flexible, knowledge-based economy) rather than 
simply redistributing wealth, the more, we might say, is such a state ‘globalised’ or ‘globalisation-ready’. 
 
This paper seeks to describe globalisation in a broad context of shifting social risks (Bonilla 
Garcia & Gruat, 2003). Processes often referred to as ‘globalisation’, especially the deepening 
international division of labour affected through growing trade and increasing investment flows, 
bring, in general, undeniable benefits. The exchange of products makes trading parties better 
off. Flows of products and investment increase productive capacity by facilitating the transfer of 
knowledge and technology. International investment flows often help to create capital 
dramatically faster than used to be the case with relatively closed economies. Openness to trade 
usually helps heterogeneous economies improve their governance patterns. But even in more 
mono-sectoral economies, where rent-seeking and monopoly practices can for a while be 
enhanced by intensified trade, the general openness can ultimately stimulate political pressure 
for change. 
On the other hand, analysts and, indeed, policy-makers need to be aware that the effects of 
globalisation depend very much on the distribution of endowments in the economy and society. 
Appropriate policy decisions based on knowledge of the linkages between globalisation-related 
effects and their impact on welfare will help to create public or market-based mechanisms that 
should aid in managing risks arising from globalisation and contribute to robust economic 
performance. 
2.2 Globalisation  today 
What, then, is globalisation? Quite often, the word comes to mean simply the increasing role of 
international trade in today’s world. 
The trend towards increases of trade flows began in the wake of the post-war boom. Between 
1967 and 1986, gross global economic output increased by a factor of 6.5 and trade by a factor 
of 10 (Storper, 1992, p. 63). Between 1985 and 2002, trade integration grew faster than world 
output in GDP – the former slightly more than tripled, the latter less than tripled (Gunter & van 
der Hoeven, 2004, p. 3) – while the world’s flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) increased 
10 times in the same period (2004, p. 6). 
By this measure, however, globalisation is nothing new, as critics often point out. The volume 
of international trade today as a percentage of production is not different from what it was a 
century ago, and the story for capital flows is similar (for a historical perspective on 
globalisation, see Bordo, Taylor & Williamson, 2003). Still, in a narrow sense, it is possible to 
define globalisation as a process, at any time in history, not just a particular age, when world 
trade grows more rapidly than production (Storper, 1992, p. 63). To extend and slightly modify 
this definition, one might say that globalisation means that intra-industry product specialisation 
grows more rapidly than overall output. Analyses based on a high level of commodity GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE | 5 
 
disaggregation confirm that trade has increased as a consequence of the specialisation of 
exchanges within the same broad sectors (ibid..; Gerstenberger, 1990). 
This deepening intra-sector specialisation affected across borders touches on another important 
facet of today’s world economy. Two-thirds of world trade is actually trade in intermediate 
products. And two-thirds of world trade is intra-company trade, done mostly by multinational 
enterprises (Gunter & van der Hoeven, 2004, p. 10). Some authors point to the role of MNEs as 
a uniquely defining feature of globalisation (Strange, 1986). The role of the MNE seems likely 
to grow in the future (Ostry, 1998, p. 86).  
At the same time, while it is true that trade has been growing rapidly, this holds for the 
developed countries and only some countries outside this club. While “the developing countries’ 
share of internationally fragmented products has remained stable over the last 15 years, the 
share of the low-income countries has decreased” (Gunter & van der Hoeven, 2004, p. 10). In 
the developing world, globalisation is basically restrained to 20 countries.  
It can be argued that these 20 countries cover 90% of the developing countries’ population 
(Reisen, Grandes & Pinaud, 2005, p. 21). The fact is, however, that globalisation is a 
phenomenon pretty much centralised on a handful of countries run by a handful of governments. 
A lot of the gains in terms of poverty reduction during globalisation, for example, have been 
advanced in two countries, China and India. In South America, it seems that trade openness has 
led to a rise in income inequalities and generally very uneven gains. This outcome has 
something to do with the structure of returns to productive assets (Morley, 2001). And one 
entire continent, Africa, has actually become more marginalised (Tsikata, 2001, p. 12). 
The rise of China alone accounts for a lot in the globalisation story. It may be an exaggeration to 
state that shutting down China today would mean shutting down globalisation – but not too 
much of an exaggeration. In 2003, China’s economy accounted for 55% of Asia’s exports. As a 
percentage of the world economy, China accounts for 7.2% of imports and 16.5% of exports 
(Reisen, Grandes & Pinaud, 2005, p. 17). The country is increasingly a price-maker in 
commodity markets (ibid., p. 19). China is the second largest holder of US Treasury bills in the 
world ($165 billion, 6.5% of total foreign holdings), which makes the cheap labour giant an 
extremely important player in US and world financial stability (ibid., p. 20).  
The Asian experience in general illustrates something that analysts have been pointing at for 
some time. A rising share of world trade is driven by processes that cannot be explained by 
traditional, comparative advantage theories (Tyson, 1987 and Storper, 1992, p. 63).
3  
This trend shows that “we live in a world where factors of production for technologically stable 
products are not endowed, but produced as intermediate outputs” (Storper, 1992, pp. 63-4). This 
observation is important as it casts a new light on social risk management and the need to 
underpin risk-taking and innovation processes by a careful policy framework in which social 
protection, education and intervention in the production of knowledge are closely connected. 
Jessop (2002, p. 119) argues that in this context it is useful to distinguish between static and 
dynamic comparative advantages. The former would be derived from the control of ‘natural’ 
resources, while the latter “are somewhat more obviously socially created, can be socially 
transformed and may well become objects of strategic intervention”. Comparative advantages 
are hard to sustain with fast standardisation, and long-term competitiveness might be 
increasingly dependent on creating social patterns that aid in the constant generation and 
effective adoption of innovations (Box 2). On the other hand, the idea of ‘international 
                                                      
3 For a discussion on various trade theories see Storper (1992, pp. 64-5). 6 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
competitiveness’ is conceptually ambiguous (ibid., p. 121), and has even been criticised as 
essentially nonsensical (Krugman, 1994, p. 256-66).   
 
Box 2. Forms of competitiveness (based on Jessop, 2002, p. 121) 
Ricardian account. Comparative advantage rests, according to the English political economist David 
Ricardo, on exploiting the most abundant and cheapest factors of production and exchanging products 
for products from other economies embodying different factor endowments. Competitiveness in this 
account depends on efficiency in allocating given resources to minimise production costs with the 
given technical division of labour. 
Listian account. Friedrich List, a 19
th century German political economist, came up with something 
equivalent to today’s ‘infant industry’ argument. A state can develop comparative advantage by 
protecting and supporting selected segments of the economy. International competitiveness here 
depends on efficiency in allocating resources towards further economic growth, which includes a 
necessary reallocation of resources for promoting new growth areas. 
Schumpeterian account. The 20
th century Austrian political economist Joseph Schumpeter outlined 
the role of permanent innovation as key for modern competitiveness. Collective capacities to promote 
innovation must cover a wide range of areas – sourcing, technologies, products, organisation and 
marketing – and must be supported by an array of extra-economic factors. The Schumpeterian account 
highlights the need for dynamic efficiency in allocating resources to promote a self-sustaining 
innovation process. 
 
The various aspects of developments in trade and investment present an interesting and 
convincing story of something happening, something that points at growing interdependence 
and can therefore be summed up under the heading of globalisation.  
But this cannot be the whole story. Some relatively recent events – such as the Asian crisis of 
1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998, also the spectacular rise (and often fall) of new financial 
actors (hedge funds), the worries about ‘financial contagion’ and the unpredictability of 
financial markets – all remind us that there is more to the cross-border movement of economic 
power than trade and investment flows.  
Some authors actually focus on the growing salience of financial markets as the key feature of 
the new economic order (Jessop, 2002, pp. 106-07). And, indeed, the rise of various instruments 
of financial intermediation (if this can still be called ‘intermediation’) tells an even more 
dramatic story than the one presented by trade figures. “Between 1963 and 1995, the size of the 
total funds raised on international markets increased at an annual growth rate of 24.3 per cent 
compared to 5.5 per cent annual growth rate in world trade and 3.2 per cent growth in global 
production” (Jessop, 2002, p. 106). These funds are increasingly seen as ‘stateless money’, 
which has a dynamic at odds with the immediate post-war financial regime (Leyshon & Tickell, 
1994). Approximately $1.5 trillion or the equivalent is exchanged daily on foreign exchange 
markets and only 5% of this amount is directly related to payments for traded goods or services 
(Jessop, 2002, p. 106). The de-territorialisation of money is being reinforced by the rise of 
various derivative instruments. 
Thus, globalisation is a multi-faceted concept. It points at changes in the relationship between 
financial flows and the production of traded goods (Guttman, 2002). It promotes the rise of new 
developmental processes emanating from post-industrial organisation, which may then clash in 
their inherent logic. Thus Jessop speaks of the conflict between the concept of knowledge as 
intellectual commons and knowledge as intellectual property and more broadly of the conflict 
between implications prioritising the information economy or those stressing the need for an GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE | 7 
 
information society (Jessop, 2002, p. 110). This is in line with contradictions sketched out 
already by Bell (1973) between the economising and sociologising logics of the post-industrial 
society. 
The various dimensions of globalisation can be described as follows (Jessop, 2002, p. 115): 
1)  the internationalisation of national economic spaces through growing penetration (inward 
flows) and extraversion (outward flows); 
2)  the formation of regional economic blocs; 
3)  the growth of more ‘local internationalisation’ and ‘virtual regions’ through the 
development of economic ties between local and regional authorities in different national 
economies; 
4)  the extension and deepening of multinationalisation through MNEs, transnational banks 
and international producer-service firms; 
5)  the widening and deepening of international regimes covering economic and 
economically relevant issues; and 
6)  the emergence of globalisation proper through the introduction of global norms and 
standards, the adoption of global benchmarking and the development of globally 
integrated markets, in which ‘deracinated’ firms with no evident national base operate. 
This list indicates that globalisation is far from producing a homogenised economic space. 
Rather, it involves a reordering of differences and complementarities in various geographical 
spaces as well as the global one, and this constant reordering is the basis for creating dynamic 
competitive advantages (ibid., p. 117). 
Depending on which facet of changes sweeping the world they want to stress, different authors 
come up with different definitions of ‘globalisation’ (Box 3). 
 
Box 3. Globalisation – Some definitions 
Globalisation is the... 
•  “integration into the world economy” and increased interdependence “through trade, investment, 
finance, regional integration, technology, and demographic factors” (Richardson, 1997, p. 50). 
•  “growing integration of economies and societies around the world as a result of flows of goods and 
services, capital, people, and ideas” (Dollar, 2001, p. 2). 
•  external opening and an increased role of markets internally (Robinson, 2001, “Preface”). 
•  process in which “trade grows more rapidly than production” (Storper, 1992, p. 66). 
•  “closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the 
enormous reductions of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of 
artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) of 
people across borders” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 9). 
•  “reorganization of production into global production systems, notably global value chains and 
export processing zones” (Carr & Che, 2004, p. 1). 
•  “gradual integration of economies and societies driven by new technologies, new economic 
relationships and the national and international policies of a wide range of actors, including 
governments, international organisations, business, labour and civil society” (Gunter & van der 
Hoeven, 2004, p. v). 8 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
•  irreversible global interconnectedness driven by “factors such as trade, technology, cross-border 
production systems, information flows, and communication” (ibid.). 
•  reversible “homogenisation of policies and institutions across the world, e.g. trade and capital 
market liberalisation; the dismantling of the welfare state; international agreements on intellectual 
property rights” (ibid.). 
•  sum of two processes – the rise of global interconnectedness owing to information and 
transportation technologies, and the global shift in policy orientations as governments around the 
world sign up to trade and investment liberalisation (World Bank, 2000, p. 1). 
•  (little more than a) “hugely extended network of localities” (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996, p. 22). 
•  “polyvalent, promiscuous, controversial word that often obscures more than it reveals” (Jessop, 
2002, p. 113). 
2.3  How to measure globalisation 
In simple terms, globalisation can be measured by indicators such as openness to trade or 
investment flows, the share of MNEs in the local economy and so on (Figures 1-3).  
Figure 1. Share of total exports as a % of GDP 
Exports of Goods and Services as a % of GDP
0.00
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Source: Ameco database (2006). GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE | 9 
 
Figure 2. Total FDI flows to and from OECD countries 
 
Source: OECD (2005). 
Figure 3. Share of foreign-controlled affiliates in manufacturing turnover
1) and employment 
(2001) 
 
Source: OECD (2005). 10 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
The degree to which a country is globalised can be measured by a combination of these 
indicators (Box 4). Globalisation then becomes a rather multi-dimensional concept, capturing 
some of the complexities and contradictions that the term entails. 
 
 
 
The OECD has also recently published a range of indicators extensively describing the 
globalisation process (OECD, 2005).  
2.4  The post-industrial economy 
Dealing with new structures of risks would not be complete without taking into consideration 
the whole conceptual framework that overlaps with the theme of globalisation, namely the shift 
from an industrial to an increasingly post-industrial mode of economic growth. 
In short, an industrial economy is one centred on large-scale manufacturing operations, based on 
assembly-line or semi-assembly line work processes. These concentrate a massified workforce, 
often employed in lifetime jobs. They derive their profit advantage from economies of scale. 
As economies become more developed, the technical content of products becomes more easily 
variable, while growing disposable incomes allow people to make more and more lifestyle 
choices. ‘Flexibility’ becomes the key word. On the one hand, products can become quickly 
modified and innovated as production and the dissemination of knowledge pick up pace through 
the use of computer and communications technologies. On the other hand, technical and 
marketing variations also become easier as the market for manufacturing products becomes 
more and more global owing to decreases in transportation costs. The ratio of costs based on 
heavy hardware decreases – again as a result of the emergence of a global competitive market 
and the widespread standardisation of basic technologies. At the same time, the returns to quick 
adaptation and innovation increase. ‘Economies of scope’ and ‘economies of networks’ become 
the main sources of profit advantage in the post-industrial component of modern economies. 
And all the while the service sector grows bigger, generating new tensions and tough policy 
choices arising from the changes in relative costs in the service and manufacturing sectors (the 
‘Baumol’ or ‘cost-disease’ effect). 
Box 4. Measuring globalisation 
Globalisation worldwide 
•  rise of trade over economic growth/productivity  
•  rise in financial flows 
•  rise in intermediate goods, growth‚ ‘globalness’ of value chains 
Globalisation of countries 
•  trade openness (exports and imports vs. GDP) 
•  investment openness (FDI and portfolio inflows and outflows; share of industry occupied by 
MNEs) 
•  participation in global value chains 
•  financial integration (multinational banks’ share of the local financial sector; industry and 
government refinancing through global markets) 
•  rise in migration GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE | 11 
 
The generic problem of modern economies becomes employment. In Europe, the problem is 
explicit and unemployment emerges as a major welfare-state failure (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 
2).  
This situation creates, in the short term, “painful policy dilemmas…to reduce unemployment, 
[in which] Europe appears compelled to embrace American-style deregulation. This will 
inevitably bring about more poverty and more inequality” (ibid., 1999, p. 3). 
A lot of the debate on the shift to post-industrialism centres on the issue of when, and if, 
countries will be able to get out of this unfortunate policy dilemma. This goal might only be 
possible with the creation of new sectors or sub-sectors of manufacturing or services, based, for 
example, on revolutionary IT or bio-technological innovation.
4 Thus, new jobs would be created 
demanding high skills. This would delete the need for de-skilling – whereby people take up low 
skill work that could often be easily done by machines, just so that they are employed.  
Of course, this is a substantial debate, complicated by the fact that the analysis of the shift to 
post-industrialism is by no means uniform across authors and schools of thought. This paper has 
so far used the dichotomy of industrial/post-industrial as a generic cleavage. Daniel Bell, who 
coined the term ‘post-industrial society’ (1973) later theorised ‘information society’, together 
with others, who put an emphasis on a ‘knowledge economy’, wherein, as some authors stress 
(Castells, 2000) that networks become the decisive ordering and organisational principle. The 
French Regulation School uses the terms ‘Fordist’ and ‘post-Fordist’ society, defined by 
extensive multidimensional description (see Box 5).  
 
Box 5. Fordism described by analytical dimensions of the French Regulation School (Jessop, 
2002, pp. 56-58) 
A distinctive type of labour process. Mass production is the main source of economic dynamism, 
focusing on assembly-line production operated by semi-skilled labour. 
A stable mode of economic growth. This mode refers to a virtuous circle of growth, wherein rising 
incomes are linked to productivity, which itself is based on economies of scale. Demand increases 
constantly with steadily rising wages.  
A mode of economic regulation. Monetary and credit policies secure effective aggregate demand. Wage 
bargains are struck in key sectors of industry, from which the ‘going rate’ spreads to other sectors of the 
economy. The state plays a crucial role in promoting mass consumption and preserving the balance 
between labour and capital demands. 
A pattern of societalisation. This mode is based on the nuclear family, urban and suburban, to which the 
market caters by providing standardised goods. The state provides bureaucratised collective goods. 
 
The central role of the state in a Fordist economy consisted of organising and promoting mass 
production and mass consumption, based on generalised lifestyle norms (Jessop, 2002, p. 59). 
The labour market had a benign dynamic of its own, with low-productivity agriculture providing 
workers eager to transfer to the industrial jobs that were being created. The state secured 
demand by policies aimed at full employment. Wage was seen as a source of demand rather 
than as an internationally comparable cost of production. As long as wages rose in line with 
productivity gains and as long as wage gains could to some extent be corrected through mild 
                                                      
4 This point concerns general trends. Of course, current employment problems in developed countries are 
exacerbated by the presence of the baby-boom generation in the labour market. 12 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
inflation, the circle of growth was uninterrupted. The state also contributed to the ‘virtuous 
circle of Fordist accumulation’ by promoting infrastructure build-up and directing urban and 
regional policies (ibid., pp. 76-77). 
It is in these ‘thirty glorious years’ of post-war growth that something called the ‘European 
social model’ (see for example, Grahl & Teague, 1997 and Palier & Sykes, 2000) emerged. This 
model is often broken down into distinctive types, as in Esping-Andersen’s famous three-world 
typology (1990). Yet many authors, including Esping-Andersen himself, stress the broad 
congruence of welfare policies among these types – similar goals achieved through different 
mechanisms (Sharpf & Schmidt, 2000, p. 9). 
The crisis of this Keynesian welfare state (Jessop, 2002, p. 80) came from several interrelated 
sources.  
After the general rise in productivity started to wear off as industrial markets became saturated, 
firms started to look more systematically than before for international expansion. This trend, 
together with the rise of international credit markets (boosted by the supply of Eurodollars), 
began to undermine the relative closure of national economies (ibid., 2002, p. 81). In this 
environment, traditional macroeconomic policies failed to work, and Western economies came 
to know the world of simultaneous stagnation and inflation (‘stagflation’), to which 
governments contributed by steadfastly sticking to old recipes. At the same time, the continuing 
drive for productivity increases intensified shop floor struggles, while rising unemployment 
undermined the balance sheet of the welfare state.  
The search for answers led to supply-side interventions (aimed at helping local economies 
integrate into the global market space), tight fiscal and monetary policies and attacks on labour 
market regulations and wages. 
In this ‘fumbling period’ (ibid., p. 91) the notion of ‘Eurosclerosis’ emerged as well as a general 
indictment of “exaggerated welfare statism” (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 4), which is to blame 
for bad economic underperformance and a host of social problems (Giersch, 1985, Lindbeck, 
1994 and Murray, 1984). 
There is, however, considerable disagreement about this diagnosis. First, many authors disagree 
with the notion that European institutions, such as the labour markets, perform that badly 
(Freeman, 2004), or point out that there is no empirical evidence supporting the notion that the 
welfare states, even some large European ones, incur anything that can be sensibly called an 
‘economic cost’ (Lindert, 2002). 
Second, there are important theoretical arguments for not scaling down labour market regulation 
and social protection, but re-orienting them to become more suitable for the globalising world. 
In this view, social protection contributes decisively to economic performance (Atkinson, 1999).  
2.5  Is globalisation ‘good’? 
The wide array of forces lumped under the heading ‘globalisation’ is no more a universal boon 
than it is a universal evil. The fact is that any policy response to new conditions in the 
international organisation of production needs to be based on a careful analysis that disentangles 
the often contradictory tendencies involved. For easier orientation, we can identify three 
dimensions that determine the impact of globalisation: 
•  the effect of various forces/forms of globalisation, 
•  the distribution of factor endowments, and 
•  institutional setting. GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE | 13 
 
In the first place, as we have indicated in the previous section, globalisation is a complex 
phenomenon, involving changing patterns of trade, investment, financial flows and company 
behaviour. In addition, it heavily overlaps the shift to a post-industrial type of economy, with 
the attendant emphasis on flexibility and fast-paced innovation, and the decreasing relative 
importance, in the most-developed economies, of large-scale industrial operations based on a 
massified workforce employed in lifetime, assembly-line work.  
Globalisation is certainly not manifested in the same way across countries. There are countries 
that trade a lot but have very little foreign investment (Japan). There are others where foreigners 
own more than half the economy but which are not major players in the manufactured products’ 
global market, with trade largely confined to the immediate neighbourhood (Canada). And there 
are also countries with economies extremely open to exports and imports as well as to foreign 
investment – for example, some new EU member states, where trade openness exceeds 100% 
and foreign capital owns three-quarters of the economy (Hungary and Slovakia). On other 
dimensions of globalisation, for example the export of capital, they are, however, insignificant. 
Furthermore, it is an obvious economic fact that the “distribution of income in a society depends 
on the distribution of income-generating assets or factors of productions – who owns the land 
and capital and how human capital is distributed in the labour force”. And it also depends on the 
returns to these assets (Robinson, 2001, p. 9). Even though there are authors who stress that 
asset ownership is driven by efficiency (Grossman & Hart, 1986), this is hardly a realistic 
scenario, and not borne out by empirical evidence. “Different countries might have very 
different asset distributions despite identical preferences and technology” (ibid.).   
In other words, radical redistributions of assets can change patterns of income for good. 
Robinson (op. cit.) cites the example of South Korea and Taiwan, both of which have very low 
income inequalities. Both countries underwent extensive land redistribution in the 1940s and 
1950s, which changed forever the distribution of production factors and returns to them. In 
contrast, two Latin American countries, Guatemala and Costa Rica, have very different income 
patterns. As transportation costs fell in the 19
th century, Americans and Europeans started mass 
importations of tropical products. While in Costa Rica, governments supported small farmers, in 
Guatemala, the elite engaged in a massive land grab. Today, Costa Rica has much lower income 
inequalities than Guatemala, which is otherwise a very similar economy. And income 
differences feed through into different human-capital formation profiles (Nugent & Robinson, 
1998 and Engerman, Mariscal & Sokoloff, 1998). In 1900, 36% of adults were literate in 
Guatemala and 36% in Costa Rica. By 1950, the differences had widened: the figures were 30% 
and 80% respectively (Thorp, 1998, Tab. IX.2). 
In general, Latin America is the region with the most unequal distribution of income in the 
world and education is the key component in understanding this distribution puzzle. Compared 
with a typical Far Eastern economy, the share of university graduates is actually higher in Latin 
America. At the same time, however, returns to university education are also higher in Latin 
America. This result is explained by the fact that “Asia spent a lot on eliminating the bottom tail 
of its educational distribution and universalising secondary education while Latin America let 
most of its youngsters leave school after primary [education], choosing instead to expand 
university coverage” (Morley, 2001, p. 16).  
So, the impact of globalisation on economies depends how it is handled by domestic institutions 
(see Box 6). There is nothing to prevent governments from responding (Rodrik, 1997). But the 
political economy dimension is important (Robinson, 2001, pp. 10-11). In general, Latin 
American income inequalities have widened in the last decade. In Africa, likewise, governments 
have mostly failed to respond to globalisation. Social sector spending is usually badly targeted 
and often regressive (Castro-Leal et al., 1999 and Tsikata, 2001, p. 13). Furthermore, 
“Globalisation affects inequality when the distribution of assets is fixed and it can change the 14 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
rates of return on different assets under an unchanged set of institutions and policies” 
(Robinson, 2001, p. 10).  
 
Box 6. Is globalisation good or bad for the poor? 
“Whether or not globalisation is pro-poor depends on how it occurs (sequencing, pace and government 
capacity) and on a government’s response to it with supply-side and compensatory policies” (Tsikata, 
2001, p. 13). 
“One of the underlying components of inequality is distribution of earnings – the primary distribution, 
which is most closely connected with economic influences. In the short-run, this is determined by the 
interaction of three factors: the distribution of the ownership of factors of production (assets) and the 
interplay of supply and demand for those factors…The supply side is critical to understanding the 
process. In the short-run, the supply of factors is fixed so demand factors, such as growth strategy, 
macroeconomic conditions and structural economic reforms, have a dominant influence on relative 
earnings and the rate of return on capital and land” (Morley, 2001, p. 13). 
“Globalisation may change relative prices, induce changes in the distribution of assets, and alter, or be 
used to alter, the political equilibrium in ways that affect inequality. The last effect is the most pernicious 
because it means that if globalisation increases inequality for either of the first two reasons, it may 
simultaneously alter the political equilibrium and stop the state compensating for these effects. The idea 
that globalisation bundles these forces together in a unique way that both increases inequality and 
removes the state’s ability to compensate for it lies at the heart of the critique of globalisation” (Robinson, 
2001, p. 11).  
 
Of course, in the heterogeneous economies of Europe the impact of globalisation through the 
distribution of factor endowments might be much more subtle. Nevertheless, it should be 
studied. Especially in the highly fluid institutional structures of the recently acceded member 
states, globalisation can play an important role in determining the growth and governance paths 
of these societies.  
In more complex Western societies, the typical political-economy dilemma of globalisation 
concerns gains from impediments to trade. While protectionism typically has a concentrated 
political constituency (for example, workers in steel plants facing competition from cheap 
imports), the gains from free trade are much more diffuse. This strengthens the tendency 
towards protectionism.  
What really determines the impact of globalisation, then, seems to be the institutional setting 
and governance patterns in the country, i.e. largely non-economic factors. Economic growth 
often depends on a weakening of existing social safety nets, in particular on the weakening of 
personal networks of support. Growth thus simultaneously brings about the danger of 
backsliding, with some delay as erosion of risk-absorbing mechanisms needs time to take its 
toll. Alongside social protection in the narrow sense, healthcare is one of the key factors. In 
countries such as the US, more than half of the cases of people sliding into poverty are 
connected with healthcare costs. Some authors attribute the spectacular rise of Japan after World 
War II to a large degree to the government’s provision of reliable and accessible healthcare 
(Krishna, 2006). 
At the same time, governance sometimes becomes decisively shaped by inflows of FDI and 
through the role of MNEs (Kottaridi, 2005). 
All in all, there is robust empirical evidence pointing at gains in material wealth that most 
countries have achieved by being part of globalisation processes. Globalisation can be GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE | 15 
 
convincingly pictured as an essentially beneficial phenomenon (Bhagwati, 2005). Nevertheless, 
it can be equally and poignantly shown that globalisation does produce, in material terms, 
winners and losers. If social policy is to contribute to sustainable economic growth, it must 
answer some of the challenges posed by globalisation (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2003).  
3.  Social risk management – The theory 
This part of the paper is organised into two subsections. The first recapitulates standard 
arguments for public welfare policies. Contrary to widespread beliefs, redistribution among 
individuals is not the dominant feature of the welfare state. Most social protection mechanisms 
simply help individuals deal with risks and uncertainty, and by doing so affect redistribution 
over an individual’s life course rather than among individuals. In dealing with uncertainty it is 
especially important to look at the role played by information asymmetries and information 
failure. 
Then, the next section introduces three key concepts delineating new thinking about the welfare 
state. The role of social protection as a productive factor is described in a paper commissioned 
by the DG Employment and Social Affairs of the European Commission (Begg et al., 2004), in 
which a new methodology for the assessment of costs and benefits of welfare policies is 
outlined. The need to help individuals manage their transitions in the new world of flexible 
labour markets through transitional labour-market policies is elaborated in a paper by Gunther 
Schmid (2006). And finally, the section points to a World Bank (2000) paper that outlines a 
comprehensive framework for dealing with social risk management.  
3.1  The standard theory of state intervention 
Social policy means the public management of social risks. These risks can belong to different 
classes. Some are ‘democratic’ – for example old age infirmity. Others are more socially 
stratified, such as unemployment or poverty.  
Individual risks become social for at least two reasons. First, the aggregate effect of them may 
have collective consequences. This result can make a case for policy that directly intervenes 
against a negative externality – for example keeping the poor out of abject poverty lest they 
resort to crime. But more dynamic effects are at stake too. Individuals without a safety net are 
likely, for example, to resist risky technological changes, which would otherwise improve 
economic output (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 37). 
Second, the growing complexity of modern societies makes it difficult to deal with risks at an 
individual level. A person with a plot of land can easily manage his/her sustenance. A worker 
selling his/her labour is much more exposed to ‘manufactured risks’. Modern societies 
inherently rely on weakening the personal ties that lock individuals in personal networks used 
for risk management (Granovetter, 1983).  
The standard theory of the welfare state provides clear demarcation lines for dealing with social 
risks by markets and by public intervention. In reviewing it, the rest of this section is closely 
based on Barr (2001, pp. 1-29). 
One of the functions of the welfare state is poverty relief. The other reason for the existence of 
social protection is to help individuals deal with risk and uncertainty. In fact, this latter function 
is dominant. In the UK, for example, two-thirds of welfare-state spending is life-cycle 
redistribution as opposed to one-third on poverty relief (ibid., 2001, p. 2), and the picture is 
similar in heavy welfare spenders such as Denmark (Sorensen, Hansen & Bovenberg, 2006).  16 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
The efficiency argument lies at the heart of thinking that stresses the inadequacy of viewing the 
welfare state as a mechanism for dividing a pie – the national income. It casts new light on 
notions such as the ‘middle class capture’ of the welfare state (Barr, 2001, p. 2). 
Equally, the argument provides a clear underpinning of the role of the government. If an 
individual has to face greater insecurities today than in the past, it is quite likely that the role for 
the government (in the way of strategic intervention rather than everyday meddling) is even 
greater than in the past. 
The welfare state is something often notoriously difficult to describe. We can identify at least 
three complicating issues (Glennerstener, 1997, ch. 1). 
First, individual welfare is something sponsored by multiple sources: paid work, private saving 
and insurance, and voluntary welfare activities such as charity and government spending. 
Second, welfare services can be delivered either privately or as public goods. Third, the 
functionality of mechanisms is difficult to determine: expenditures that do not count as social 
protection – public health or the environment – actually have a lot to do with increasing welfare 
and are similar in mode of delivery. 
On the other hand, the efficiency criterion allows us to take a broader and functionally rather 
clearly oriented view of public intervention. 
The argument for public intervention can be illustrated by a simple three-step model. First, we 
introduce a situation of certainty and a rational consumer. Second, relaxing the assumption of 
certainty we let the consumer face risks. In the third and final step, we relax the assumption 
even further and introduce the world of uncertainty. 
The welfare choices with certainty can be easily illustrated by the Fisher model (Figure 4). In 
the model, we have a person’s potential consumption in younger years sketched along the 
horizontal axis, and the potential consumption in older years given by the vertical axis. From an 
initial endowment given by point a, s/he can consume C1 units in period 1 and C2 units in period 
2. Borrowing or saving can increase his/her options. S/he could save, for example, C1-C’1 units 
of consumption in period 1 in exchange for C’2-C2 in period 2, which moves him/her to point e. 
Figure 4. The Fisher model 
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Introducing risks does not change anything in this model. Risk is an event for which a 
probability distribution is known, in contrast to uncertainty, where it is not. With distributions 
known, risks can be pooled and insurance mechanisms organised. So, an individual can buy 
market-provided actuarial insurance, which allows him/her to preserve a preferred consumption 
pattern (Barr, 2001, p.13). 
The real world is one of uncertainty, however, which can have at least three dimensions: 
•  imperfect information, 
•  behavioural uncertainty and imperfectly informed insurers, and 
•  external shocks – natural catastrophes, demographic change, etc. 
The information dimension provides a key rationale for public intervention. Markets are good at 
absorbing only good risks (Barr, 2001, pp. 14-26 and Esping-Andersen, 1999, pp. 37-40). Social 
insurance is thus a natural response to information failure.  
So, under conditions of uncertainty, we have a case for government intervention. Such 
intervention can take several forms – regulation, financing, public production and income 
transfers. But generally, policies should be based on two considerations: their theoretical quality 
and the effectiveness of their implementation. 
Risks can be usefully classified, for social protection purposes, as falling into three categories: 
class risks, life-course risks and intergenerational risks (Esping-Andersen, 1999, pp. 40-43). The 
absorption of risks can be undertaken by mechanisms provided by the market, the welfare state 
and the family.  
The discussion of how risks are managed has over time evolved into recognition that “studying 
just the welfare state leaves a huge ‘welfare residual unaccounted for’” – hence the novel 
practice of using the term ‘welfare regimes’ (ibid., 1999, p. 34). Representatives of this ‘second 
generation’ of welfare policy authors, who focused on the mix of public-private provision of 
welfare, include Stephens (1979), Myles (1984), Castles (1986 and 1993) and Esping-Andersen 
(1990). 
Through these authors, a broader definition of social protection started to emerge, in which 
social policy simply means the management of social risks (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 36), in 
the framework of the ‘welfare triad’ of the state, the market and the family (ibid., p. 35). 
3.2  New conceptual developments in social risk management 
In this context, policy documents have begun to look at the wider picture of welfare provision 
(actors and modes of delivery involved – public or market, informal or formal) and also to stress 
social protection as a productive factor. Three recent theoretical developments that help to 
underpin this paradigm can be identified. A report for the DG Employment and Social Affairs of 
the European Commission (Begg et al., 2004), The Costs of Non-Social Policy, sketched out a 
methodology for the impact assessment of social protection that goes beyond the traditional 
cost-benefit analysis. Analytical and policy documents have also started adopting the framework 
of transitional labour markets (Schmid, 2006), which focus on helping people manage the risks 
related to transitions in a flexible labour market. The World Bank published a document that 
purports to establish a conceptual basis for analysing social protection as part of a wider social 
risk-management framework.  
Viewing social protection as a productive factor is already a step in the direction of a wider risk-
management framework (see Box 7). 
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Box 7. The case for social risk management 
In a neoclassical analytical framework, one might point out that at the minimum the welfare state deals 
with externalities (e.g. less crime because of social benefits or a reduced risk of epidemics owing to 
effective universal healthcare). Other welfare state functions have even more direct economic effect, e.g. 
consumption smoothing in the case of pensions or income smoothing in the case of unemployment 
benefits. But this is not the whole story. The provision of social benefits to a large extent actually makes 
entrepreneurial risk-taking possible. Castells (1998) describes how even in Hong Kong, which is often 
depicted as a typical laissez-faire economy, the bankruptcy rate has always been roughly the same as in 
any other economy. Yet, if a person can rely on the safety net at least to the extent that a business failure 
does not mean a complete loss of food and shelter, s/he may be more willing to take reasonable individual 
risks. In this way, the state creates the sphere where things such as marginal utilities are calculable and 
can ultimately be expressed in a commodified and monetary form. This is similar to other state functions. 
The state sanctions limited liability (a relatively recent invention), and does not allow incarceration for 
personal debt (ditto). Both of these provisions move risks into the realm of commodified assets, whereby 
they become easily expressible in financial terms. 
 
Econometric studies actually show that social protection expenditure cannot be seen as a ‘cost’ 
to the economy – and thus the welfare state looks like a free lunch (Lindert, 2002). In order to 
truly assess the impact of social policy, however, one needs to have a comprehensive framework 
in place for taking into account the various dynamic effects. Begg et al. (2004) attempt to do 
exactly that. Their approach towards the costs of non-social policy turns the question of costs 
around so that “it is the non-policy rather than policy that is under scrutiny” (ibid., p. i). This 
approach goes well beyond the scope of traditional cost-benefit analyses. 
For some, using the term ‘risk management’ in place of social protection may sound like a 
strategy for doing away with the empathic side of welfare policy. Social responsibility, 
solidarity and concern for the community are sidelined as cold ‘management’ takes over. What 
remains is a policy orientation towards economic growth. Yet others disagree. Schmid (2006, p. 
3) points out that the concept of risk management allows us to construct a “‘moral opportunity’ 
to reconsider where the new balance between solidarity and individual responsibility might lie”. 
Schmid’s transitional labour markets concept seeks to overcome various asymmetries in risk 
perception and “combine flexibility and security by establishing institutionalised ‘bridges’ at 
critical junctures in individuals’ working lives”. 
Traditional definitions of social protection have several shortcomings, most notably they over-
emphasise the role of the public sector and conceptualise the welfare state in terms of its costs. 
Also, through this lens the welfare state is rather narrowly defined (e.g. excluding education) 
and viewed through its segments. As a result, the need for a broader strategic outlook based on 
the congruence and overlapping aims of these policies is clouded. 
The World Bank has thus come up with an aim of re-conceptualising social protection so that 
(Holzmann & Jorgensen, 2000, p. 3): 
•  it can be seen as a spring-board rather than an inelastic safety net that traps and holds 
people in certain social positions; 
•  it is seen not as a cost but as an investment in human capital formation; and  
•  the causes of poverty rather than the symptoms are taken care of. 
Social risk management is in this context seen as a framework overlapping but not coterminous 
with social protection. Sound macroeconomic policy, good governance and access to education 
and healthcare help individuals manage risks but are not part of social protection mechanisms 
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Source: Holzmann & Jorgensen (2000). 
The social risk-management framework takes into account that various risk-management 
strategies can be employed. The first is to avoid risk or reduce the probability of running a 
certain risk. Second, the impact of risk can be mitigated by various mechanisms: assets can be 
diversified so as not to all fall victim to the same hazard; formal or informal insurance (e.g. the 
pooling of risks by a family) mechanisms can be employed; or income can be hedged (as in 
forward exchange rates or other derivative products, but elements of informal hedging can also 
be found in various partnership or networking strategies used by individuals). Third, once a risk 
materialises, people have to employ various measures to cope with it – dis-save, work more than 
expected, sell assets, etc. With few buffers, as with poor people without safety nets, individuals 
have to resort to strategies that often incur personal costs far greater than the impact the risk 
would normally warrant – e.g. resorting to crime or to damaging financial strategies (swapping 
one debt for another with a higher interest rate). 
The framework also outlines the dimension of the formality of risk management mechanisms 
and the dimension of actors that engage in risk management (see Box 9). The framework 
recognises that there are far more risk-management interactions possible than simply the 
relationship of an individual with an employer and the state. 
Adapting the framework to conceptualise the role of social risk management within economic 
growth, one can posit it in among the drivers of growth, which lead to increasing output but can 
also have much more direct impact as shocks, as shown in Box 10. 
 
Box 8. Social protection and social risk management 
Overlapping circles – social risk management (SRM), social protection (SP) and redistribution 
SRM, which exceeds the definition of SP in terms of 
-  macroeconomic policy 
-  good governance 
-  access to basic education and healthcare 
SP, which exceeds the definition of SRM in terms of 
-  measures to support the critically poor 20 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
 
 
 
 
From a slightly different angle, the dynamic impact of social risk-management mechanisms on 
economic growth can be pictured as in Box 11. 
 
 
 
Box 9. Social risk management framework 
•  Risk management strategies  Reduction/avoidance 
Mitigation  - Portfolio diversification 
- Informal and formal insurance 
- Hedging  
Coping 
 
•  Level of formality    Informal 
Market-based 
Publicly provided or mandated 
 
•  Actors    Individuals/households 
Communities 
 Non-governmental  organisations 
 Market  institutions 
 Government 
 International  institutions 
Box 10. Social risk management and drivers of change 
Trade, technology, political system 
 
 
Growth (+,-)   Shocks   
 
 
  Social risk management: 
- reduced vulnerability 
- enhanced consumption smoothing 
- improved equity 
 
 
 
Social impact 
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Box 11. Dynamic impact of social risk management on growth 
Social risk management 
– Income/consumption smoothing 
– Effectiveness and costs of informal provision      Economic growth 
– Costs of public provision 
 
In this framework, then, policies oriented towards endowments (in terms of education, health, 
social and human capital) rather than redistribution and policies aimed at life-course transitions 
rather than singular classes of risks become much more prominent than was the case with the 
old, narrowly defined social-protection framework. 
4.  Governance and competitiveness in a globalising world 
4.1 Conceptualising  ‘competitiveness’ 
Competitiveness is a deeply controversial concept. It is a  natural correlate of the rise of 
globalisation in public consciousness, understandably popular with policy-makers who seek to 
demonstrate to the electorate that they are doing something about stalling growth or other 
problems. The Clinton administration in 1990s, while going ahead with NAFTA, was 
particularly interested in engaging in occasionally protectionist or neo-mercantilist discourse. 
Public haggling with the Japanese over their trade surpluses with the US became prominent 
news stuff. A number of public intellectuals with strong links to academia (Laura Tyson, Robert 
Reich and Lester Thurow) provided ammunition for this, and President Bill Clinton picked 
some of them for posts in his administration.
5 Sometimes the issue was downright protectionism 
of established industries, as in the case of efforts to stop imports of cheap steel. But usually, 
promoting competitiveness was here equated with ‘strategic intervention’. This concept is 
grounded in now standard economic theory, which, for example, seeks to explain the rationale 
for protecting those industries producing for markets with extraordinarily high entry costs but 
eventually high profits.
6 One of the best-known economists of today, Paul Krugman, has been 
particularly scathing of widespread ‘strategic intervention’ policies. He argues that 
‘competitiveness’ is an essentially meaningless concept, at best clouding the whole rationale for 
gaining in welfare by producing what one is best at producing, at worst wasting money on 
promoting industries that are not even high value-added although the proponents of ‘strategic 
intervention’ tend to think they are (Krugman, 1994, pp. 256-67). 
Nevertheless, the attractions of strategic intervention will never go away. First, there is the 
empirical evidence. For example, by the late 1960s, the US was clearly lagging behind other 
industrialised countries in producing and implementing innovation. The public funding of 
research was largely confined to NASA and military projects. Since then, however, public 
expenditure has clearly contributed to giving the US a head start in developing a knowledge 
economy. By having a universities-based computer network that started out as a publicly 
funded, military project (ARPANET), the US was easily poised to become the cradle of the 
                                                      
5 Laura Tyson became Head of the Council of Economic Advisors and Robert Reich served as Secretary 
of Labour.  
6 Paul Krugman illustrates this concept developed by James Brander and Barbara Spencer with the 
example of strategic competition between Boeing and Airbus (1994, pp. 235-39). 22 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
Internet. The US Department of Defense significantly sponsored the infant semi-conductor 
industry in the 1960s. Federal money given to universities for use as loans and scholarships to 
attract students from all around the world has also been clearly beneficial. Some of the 
engineering and natural science departments are predominantly staffed by academics of non-US 
origin.
7 It was clearly these successes that inspired European policy-makers when they were 
drawing up the Lisbon agenda, which aims at making Europe the most competitive knowledge-
based economy in the world by 2010. 
The theoretical underpinnings of state intervention that seeks to improve a country’s chances to 
gain from an international division of labour start with revisions to classical trade theories based 
on Ricardo. Theorists of the ‘economics of QWERTY’ (Paul David and Brian Arthur) long ago 
pointed out that countries often get locked into a certain economic position by fluke rather than 
by a natural development based on factor distribution. But if it is chance that determines 
competitive position, why not improve the prospects by intervention? The experience of East 
Asia shows that careful government intervention can create industries with high value-added 
and high welfare gains, out of almost nothing. Many authors speak of a ‘socially created 
comparative advantage’ as a contrast to comparative advantage based on the natural distribution 
of factor endowments, particularly of raw materials (Jessop, 2002, p. 119). It is the social 
creation of comparative advantages that is important in the world of knowledge-based 
economies. The welfare state should then be oriented towards serving the knowledge-based 
society rather than focused on providing old-fashioned insurance mechanisms fit for old, 
industrial economies (ibid., pp. 267-76). 
The vague concept of competitiveness can be described as comprised of three dimensions: trade, 
investment flows and technology diffusion. These dimensions can be captured quantitatively – 
as when conceptualising globalisation in terms of the volumes of trade and investment flows. 
But qualitative analysis is probably equally desirable, especially if it is structurally based. 
Institutionalist analysis would look at the role of the principal agents in competitiveness: the 
role of MNEs in technology diffusion or the role of firms and governments, respectively, in the 
creation of comparative advantage. 
Competitiveness here becomes closely related to the role of agents in finding the comparative 
advantage of a region or a country, enhancing its capabilities and building advantages that allow 
for the best welfare gains. Management and governance are important not only in creating 
capabilities but in sustaining them and helping to draw on them – two partners may equally gain 
from trade, but they may not equally make use of the advantages gained. 
The related research agenda is understandably varied (Box 12). It encompasses economic 
geography. This interdisciplinary science tries to understand how technology clusters are 
formed or why and how certain industries tend to become geographically concentrated. Theories 
of the firm are equally important. Research into why firms exist, how they gain competitive 
advantages, how they drive knowledge creation and diffusion has a long pedigree. 
 
                                                      
7 The long-circulating joke asks: Which are the best Russian universities? The answer: Stanford, MIT… GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE | 23 
 
 
 
 
How this feeds into the discussion on welfare and social protection is fairly obvious, and 
perhaps can be best summed up under two headings: location and skills.  
Changing patterns in the international division of labour may have differential geographical 
effects. Compensating regions that lose out, in order to cushion them against welfare losses and 
help them find replacement for the production lost to other locations, is one form of policy 
response. Presumably, such reactive measures could be supplemented by more proactive 
policies. One of the key problems is having an economy flexible enough to create new jobs as 
some are lost to delocalisation.  
The issue of skills is best viewed as one component of the conceptualisation of a modern, 
globalised welfare state where the supply-side becomes arguably more important than classical 
insurance mechanisms organised by the state to take care of transient unemployment problems. 
Lifelong learning is one of the key rallying calls of this new way of thinking, which emphasises 
that the typical post-war social policy was inordinately focused on the elderly (Esping-
Andersen, 2006, p.1). This is in line with the thinking that social policy should broadly aim at 
helping individuals to manage risks, primarily by endowing them with the capabilities to do so, 
rather than focus exclusively on the narrow mechanisms of insurance, redistribution and 
consumption smoothing. 
4.2  Issues in researching trade, investment and technology diffusion 
It has already been mentioned that traditional theories of trade derived from Ricardo, while 
insightful, do not help to explain much about socially-created comparative advantages.  
An interesting question in this context is why firms and countries actually trade (Storper, 1992, 
p. 65). Similarly, theoretical frameworks for explaining why firms invest abroad are by no 
means congruent (Barrell & Pain, 1997). 
Recently, the new endogenous growth theory has come up with a comprehensive research 
agenda based on the break with the neoclassical tradition, which treats some decisive factors of 
growth – particularly technological change and human capital – as exogenous variables. This 
has led to interesting research into innovation patterns and regional development (Martin & 
Sunley, 1998). 
Box 12. Researching competitiveness 
Competitiveness is a concept that broadly encompasses policies in the following areas: 
•  trade 
•  investment 
•  technology diffusion 
It can have these dimensions: 
•  quantitative 
•  qualitative – structures and actors (e.g. governments and MNEs)  
Some developments in economic theory that deal with issues related to competitiveness: 
•  Growth theories (e.g. endogenous growth theory) 
•  Trade theories 
•  Economic geography 
•  Theories of firms (e.g. why do firms exist and why do firms invest abroad) 24 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
The geographical dimension of competitiveness has prompted other authors to study knowledge 
diffusion based on the question of to what extent technological spillovers are local or global 
(Keller, 2002).  
The answer is, partly, that it depends on the country; different countries have different 
technology absorption capabilities and exhibit a different permeability of borders to technology 
and types of investments that determine technology adoption (Kogut, 1991 and Malmberg, 
Sölvell & Zander, 1996). This variation contributes to the emergence of regional asymmetries 
owing to technology adoption (Giovannetti, 2000). A study by Barrell & Pain (1997) surveying 
FDI patterns after the establishment of the Common Market has documented that while the UK 
has been able to attract labour-intensive investments, Germany, France, Belgium and Ireland 
have been targets of more capital-intensive FDI and investors’ affiliates in these countries 
clearly have a higher research intensity (ibid., p. 1777). 
Spatial technological clustering and the local accumulation of knowledge cannot be studied 
without at least partial regard for the analysis of the firm as an agent of economic activity. Case 
studies help to highlight how the policies of the host country affect technology transfer to 
foreign subsidiaries (Basant & Fikkert, 1996, Supapol, 1995 and Siddhartan & Sfarian, 1997). 
The interaction between governments and MNEs as important actors in the diffusion of 
knowledge seems to be under-researched, at least in the case of developed countries, which is 
strange given the increasing role of MNEs and the rise in corporate consortia to organise 
research (Ostry, 1998, pp. 86 and 88). The MNE is also an important object of study since it 
seems to not only be an important conduit for technology diffusion but also of management 
patterns and culture. This is especially important given the fact that while firms do adapt to 
changing global market conditions, they adapt in different ways, and these ways of adaptation 
are often determined, despite all talk of globalisation, by the underlying nationality of the 
corporation (Pauly & Reich, 1997). Studies show that US firms, especially car manufacturers, 
typically invest less in human resources than their Japanese or European counterparts 
(MacDuffie & Kochan, 1995). Whereas Japanese car manufacturers start by investing in human 
resources and move only incrementally into sophisticated technology, US firms do the opposite 
(Flamm, 1988 and Stern, 1994). In general, the transfer of competitiveness may involve both 
‘soft’ (human resources and management practices) and ‘hard’ transfers (machinery), and the 
mix and timing can have an important impact on local development and further patterns of 
knowledge diffusion (Ettlinger & Patton, 1996).  
Policies aimed at improving competitiveness are thus coterminous with policies aimed at 
promoting the right innovation. Innovation can have several aspects (see Box 13) and the right 
mix is essential. 
 
 
 
Box 13. How does innovation occur?  
Entrepreneurial innovation can take several forms: 
•  the introduction of a new good or a modification of an existing good; 
•  the introduction of a new method of production; 
•  the opening of a new market;  
•  the conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or intermediate goods; and 
•  the implementation of a new organisation of the entire branch of industry (for example 
establishing or breaking a monopoly). 
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Storper (1992) argues that today leading edges of economic activity are organised to carry out 
continuous innovation, in what he terms product-based technological learning (PBTL). He 
draws up a PBTL framework to explain “why certain products are made in relatively few 
places” (ibid., p. 63). These places he calls “technology districts”. Traditional explanations of 
the occurrence of trade are based on factor cost differentials, economies of scale and 
technological mastery. According to Storper, 
In the standard trade theory, comparative advantage emerges either from the range of 
natural resources present in a given place or from reductions in relative costs of 
production owing to the choice of activities best adapted to the local factors mix. Yet 
when a product is subject to the conditions of perfect competition on which the 
standard Ricardian theory rests, there are ample reasons for expecting that, in today’s 
world, the proportion of its output that is traded will steadily diminish. This result, 
precisely the opposite of that predicted by the standard theory, emerges because the 
world of production has changed fundamentally since the time of Ricardo. We now live 
in a world where factors of production for technologically stable products are not 
endowed, but produced as intermediate inputs. Almost any developed country can 
become as efficient as the next country in a technologically stable manufacturing sector 
(emphasis added). 
The diffusion time for standardised technologies has diminished as technological advancement 
has spread around the globe. This would mean that in markets with relatively low barriers to 
entry, something must make advantage possible in the face of rapid technological catch-up by 
competitors, to permit lasting advantages by firms or countries and trade to exist. Storper 
describes an endogenous form of dynamic technological advantage (PBTL), which permits the 
continuous reinvention, differentiation and reconfiguration of products. 
Thus, “competition now takes a different temporal form than it did 30 years ago; instead of 
being intermittent and creating medium-term advantages, it has become more continuous, with 
much briefer temporal advantages” (ibid., p. 67).  
‘Strategic intervention’ in promoting innovation has become an increasingly popular option 
around the world. What lies behind it is the understanding that “skill- and knowledge-based 
competition is now more dependent than before on resources that lie outside major firms”. 
Broader state intervention can have several objectives particularly relevant for the new 
globalising world (based on Jessop, 2002, p. 126):  
•  the establishment of legal forms for broad cross-national cooperation; 
•  input on the regulation of the international monetary system; 
•  the promotion of technology transfers; 
•  the management of frameworks for trade; 
•  input on defining the international regime for intellectual property rights; and 
•  the development and sustenance of regulation on labour migration. 
States clearly have a key role in promoting innovation, technology transfer, creating 
mechanisms for technology adoption and building broader frameworks for the economy to 
benefit from R&D activities undertaken in specific locations of the economy (Archibugi, 
Howells & Michie, 1999, Dunning, 2000 and Petit & Soete, 1999). An important aspect of this 
process is a close integration of universities and the economy through market proxies and the 
overall subsumption of intellectual commons under competitiveness-driven activities organised 
by the state in cooperation with the academic world (Kelly, 1998, p. 77, Menzies, 1998, pp. 92-
3 and 166-68). The state plays an important role in the transformation of knowledge from 
intellectual commons to private property (Aoki, 1998 and Dawson, 1998). Intellectual labour 
becomes established as wage labour-producing knowledge for the market (Schiller, 1988 and 26 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
1999). At the same time, the state engages in such old-fashioned public interventions as the 
sponsorship of R&D institutes and universities, or the establishment of research consortia. In 
today’s economic conditions, the states that, from a long-term point of view, best help their 
citizens gain in welfare might be those that carefully identify the main drivers of growth and 
invest in them (Aiginger, 2005). 
The importance of creating a knowledge society to underpin a knowledge-based economy is the 
basis for new thinking about the state broadly helping its citizens to manage their welfare. A 
shift from an emphasis on relatively rigid, mass-based, standardised welfare to individualised, 
life-course, broadly comprehensive ‘workfare’ now seems to be the decisive tendency 
underlying social protection reforms (Jessop, 2002, pp. 140-71). Education plays one of the key 
roles (Esping-Andersen, 2006). 
4.3  Globalisation and governance 
Governance mediates the impact of trade, investment and technology diffusion. It is therefore 
important to be aware of potential linkages between these drivers of economic growth and the 
welfare of individuals and communities. The causal diagram, however, is more complicated. 
Globalisation processes are not only mediated by governance, they also influence it. 
The most obvious impact economic openness has on the administrative environment is on rent-
seeking opportunities and their likelihood. Robust empirical evidence points at a strong 
correlation between increases in openness and a reduction of corruption. Three causal 
relationships can be identified as key: trade policy, competition by foreign producers and 
investors, and differences in institution-building costs and benefits (Bonaglia, Braga de Macedo 
& Bussolo, 2001, p. 9).  
Increases in a country’s trade are strongly related to increases in the size of its government 
(ibid., p. 13). In fact, public expenditure growth is correlated with the level of economic 
development and can be viewed as its natural consequence. Rodrick (1998) has constructed a 
model in which “government size provides an indirect insurance against risks originating from 
global markets” (Bonaglia, Braga de Macedo & Bussolo, 2001, p. 13). Turbulences caused by 
increased competition are absorbed by state-provided safety nets. 
To conclude the cycle of observed empirical regularities, it is important to state also that open 
economies tend to grow faster (ibid.). To put it in the context of economic competition, 
“corruption thrives when monopoly power is combined with discretion and low accountability” 
(ibid., p. 14).  
Of course, in real life this can present a ‘catch 22’ scenario, as high economic growth demands 
good quality institutions, where accountability is high and room for personal discretion low. 
Unless a certain momentum can be created for integrating a country into the international 
division of labour, governance might not improve. Yet integration might not be attained with 
bad governance. 
A theoretical framework is desirable to help identify various types of rent-seeking activities and 
their attendant causal mechanisms. Krueger (1974) analyses rent-seeking in connection with 
tariffs and quotas. Bhagwati (1982) extends this analysis to identify an array of directly 
unproductive, profit-seeking activities. A more detailed and dynamic analysis is provided by 
Ades & Di Tella (1999), who discuss two opposing tendencies: larger rents resulting from an 
environment of low competition strengthen the position of the bureaucrats who extract them, but 
also make it more valuable to the society as a whole to increase transparency and monitoring. It 
is the net effect on corruption that is interesting to observe. This framework is extended by Wei 
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Figure 5. Determinants of corruption 
 
Source: Bonaglia, Braga de Macedo & Bussolo (2001, p. 17) from Wei (2000). 
It is clear, then, that receptiveness to the opportunities offered by globalisation depends on a 
particular political constellation within a country. But the impact of globalisation-related 
economic effects can also be mediated and manipulated by political actors. It is important to 
understand that globalisation a) has a differential impact on the population depending on the 
distribution of economic and political endowments and b) can provide political actors with 
different sources of power, which in turn may determine what kind of globalising processes the 
country will undergo.  
Since globalisation changes returns to factor endowments and may change relative prices, it also 
changes the balance of power in a country and political actors can see it as a power resource. As 
Robinson (2001) points out, “it is no coincidence that the military regimes in Chile (after 1973) 
and Argentina (after 1976) were the first Latin American countries to embrace globalisation”. 
Trade liberalisation weakened the power of labour-based domestic opponents, such as trade 
unions. 
Globalisation “involves either rising or falling inequality” (Robinson, 2001, p. 18). In 
integrating a country into global trade, the rising returns to the abundant factor of production (as 
postulated by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem) also increase the incentives to own it (ibid., p. 
10). Again, the robustness of institutions is key for providing the opportunity to turn gains from 
trade into a process leading to equitable and sustainable growth. 
5.  Challenges for Europe 
5.1 Globalisation,  family  failure and population ageing 
The sources of pressure for change in European social-protection mechanisms come under three 
broad headings.  
First, there are the pressures stemming from globalisation and the move to a more post-
industrial economy. These issues have been the focus of this paper. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to disentangle the effects of globalisation as such and some of the attendant repercussions that 
impact society at the same time. 
Second, family structures are changing. The nuclear family can be relied upon less and less for 
helping individuals to absorb risks. It is particularly the countries belonging to whatever remains 
of Esping-Andersen’s cluster of corporatist welfare states – with their focus on the male 28 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
breadwinner – that are in the most urgent need of reform (Esping-Andersen, 2002). Incomplete 
households, unofficial cohabitation and multiple marriages throughout an individual’s life – all 
of these change the landscape of social protection needs. But different life-course practices are 
also accompanied by different fertility patterns, most notably by postponing the birth of the first 
child or deciding not to have children at all. And, generally, the diversification of life-course 
practices as opposed to fairly uniform patterns observed in the past adds another dimension to 
the demand for making social protection systems more ‘flexible’. Social protection, if it is to 
respond to these changes, would need to be more clearly life-course oriented.
8  
Third, there is the problem of demographic ageing. This stems from two factors. People live 
longer. And they have fewer and fewer children. Falling birth rates are a phenomenon observed 
practically everywhere in the developed, and, increasingly, the developing world. As countries 
grow richer, people have fewer children. And, as countries undergo major social 
transformations accompanied by the availability of birth control, birth rates plummet even more 
dramatically – as recently seen in Central and Eastern Europe (UNIFEM, 2006, Tab. 1.5).  
Adverse demographics particularly affect the healthcare and pension systems. It also affects 
overall economic performance. 
European populations will start stagnating between 2010 and 2020, and whatever economic 
growth is to be achieved after the latter date will have to come purely from rises in productivity 
(European Commission, 2005c, p. 28). 
That, at least, is the scenario based on observed trends. A recent project sponsored by the 
European Commission, called DEMWEL
9 (Demographic Uncertainty and the Sustainability of 
Social Welfare Systems) has addressed the need for basing policies on demographic uncertainty 
rather than baseline forecasts, by drawing attention to probabilistic projections. Arguably, 
policies need to be made robust for any change, not simply tailored to the most pessimistic 
scenario. 
The pressures on the welfare state translate in the public sphere into the debate on the reforms of 
the mechanisms of social protection and those that underpin the welfare state. Sometimes this 
can result in a string of parametric changes to the system, as seems to be the case with 
healthcare. In most other areas, however, the trend is to debate more paradigmatic changes, 
premised on a new balance of power and set of needs between the citizen and the state. Such is 
the case with reforms to not only the labour market, tax and pension systems but also those 
concerning childcare and education. Some of the radical reforms debated may not be feasible or 
warranted but the fact is that a lot of novel or re-born proposals come up. The following sections 
therefore briefly discuss the reform processes in these areas. 
5.2 Unemployment 
The persistence of high unemployment in a number of European countries is frequently 
identified as the key challenge for the EU, and increasingly ranks in first place in lists of 
priorities for social policy across the Union. In 2005, the Lisbon agenda was re-launched with a 
narrow focus on two areas: economic growth and employment (European Commission, 2005a).  
                                                      
8 And consequently, modelling that underpins research on the sustainability of social protection systems 
needs to look more closely into the transitions in individuals’ lives, rather than assuming fairly uniform 
patterns that are easy to aggregate. Recent examples include the MicMac model (van der Gaag, de Beer & 
Willekens, 2005). 
9 For further information on DEMWEL, see the ENEPRI website (www.enepri.org). GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE | 29 
 
Empirical evidence that relates employment rates with labour market institutions is sometimes 
scarcer than the host of theoretical arguments (IMF, 2003, p. 129). Nevertheless, empirical 
studies (Nickell, Ochel & Quintini, 2001) and recent econometric exercises – for example using 
the IMF’s Global Economy Model (IMF, 2003) – indicate that comprehensive labour market 
reforms can generate significant gains. At the same time, labour market institutions are a 
necessary component of market economies, given that labour markets cannot be, by definition, 
perfectly competitive (ibid., p. 130; Blanchard, 2002). They have an important risk-reducing 
role (Agell, 1999) and other economic rationales (Blanchard & Giavazzi, 2002). 
Indeed, it is important to point out that European labour markets are not all that awful as some 
comparisons, especially with the US, want to indicate. They produce a lower dispersion of pay 
within the same narrowly defined skills groups. And, for example, lower employment among 
women compared with the US is to a very large extent related to the fact that US households 
rely much more on the marketisation of traditional household activities (Freeman, 2004).  
Globalisation contributes to the destruction as well as creation of jobs. Recent studies on the 
relocation of production indicate that only 6% of job losses in the EU in the period 2002-05 
resulted from the relocation or off-shoring of activities (Economic Policy Committee, 2005, p. 
10). 
There is a sense that globalisation contributes to instability in social relationships because of the 
pressure for fast changes in the labour market. On the other hand, long-term employment 
relationships, while still dominant, no longer convey a sense of security. It is often the flexibility 
of the labour market combined with extensive social protection that provides a better sense of 
security as well as higher quality of work (Auer, 2005).  
Labour market reforms face a number of complications. Almost all net job creation today comes 
from service sector jobs. Between 1979 and 1993, the OECD countries lost (as an unweighted 
average) 22% of their manufacturing jobs (ibid.). Yet new jobs are not created fast enough to 
absorb de-industrialisation job losses in the same way as was done during the pre- and post-war 
de-ruralisation periods. Three dilemmas can be identified here. 
First, the expansion of the tertiary labour market brings about a larger share of low-skilled 
services. Second, service sector expansion entails the well-known ‘Baumol cost-disease effect’ 
(Baumol, 1967). Third, a lot depends on household consumption choices since households can, 
in principle, often use household work as a substitute for services (Esping-Andersen, 1999, pp. 
103-04).  
De-industrialisation, of course, differs from country to country, with massive losses in some 
countries with uncompetitive industries such as in the UK or Spain, and much better adaptation 
in others, as in Germany, Denmark or Italy (ibid., 1999, p. 120). 
Esping-Andersen (1999, pp. 117-19) promotes the idea of a ‘new Keynesian household’ to deal 
with job creation problems. The idea here is that policies that facilitate the spread of two-earner 
households create exactly the type of intensely service-consuming households that we need 
today. 
Of course, the political economy of reforms is crucial here. Various industrial relations models 
vary in their receptiveness to change. The worst-case scenario, it seems, is where industrial 
organisations are strong but neither centralised nor capable of coordination, supporting 
militancy and strong gains for the insiders but neglect for the outsiders. “Economic performance 
is likely to be superior when either ‘markets’ or ‘neo-corporatism’ prevail” (ibid., 1999, p. 121). 
This view is supported, for example, by the theoretical studies of Lindbeck & Snower (1988a 
and 1988b) and the ‘hump-shaped curve’ hypothesis of macroeconomic performance (Calmfors 
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But which way should the reforms generally go? Some diagnose European problems as 
‘Eurosclerosis’ and give the recipe as ‘flexibilise!’ (Siebert, 1997). Nevertheless, there is a 
difference here between the continental corporatist systems with rigid labour market policies 
and the Nordic systems with flexible labour markets but comprehensive social protection. The 
Swedish Rehn-Meidner model deliberately sought to reduce employment in uncompetitive 
industries (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 123). The Danish and the Dutch ‘flexicurity’ model 
(Wilthagen & Tros, 2004) has become the latest buzzword in the world of social protection. 
In general, Scandinavia’s triple accent on generous income guarantees, active labour market 
policy and welfare-state employment growth (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 123) seems to be a 
viable alternative to pure-market reforms. Scandinavian successes in employment and growth 
draw attention and inspire governments of countries that had traditionally been thought as 
belonging firmly in the ‘liberal’ camp (Giddens, 2005, pp. 109-10 and 112). 
5.3 Pension  reforms 
Population ageing puts pressure on existing social-protection mechanisms. This tendency is 
most explicit in the form of the fiscal pressure on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. As 
the ratio of the working-age population to the retired decreases, the lack of economic power to 
provide for the elderly manifests itself as the need for adjustment – an increase in contributions, 
a reduction of pensions or the raising of the retirement age. Shortfalls can be at least partly 
offset by rising productivity. That is why pension reforms would ideally address the challenge 
by effecting changes in a combination (or possibly all) of these areas: adjusting the statutory 
pension age in line with longevity gains, cutting overgenerous pensions and making 
contributions higher, ideally in absolute volume by promoting economic efficiency. Such 
changes can be accomplished by having a pension system that provides for the efficient 
allocation of assets (savings of the future retirees) in the economy and which provides the right 
labour market incentives.    
At the same time, pension reforms involve important issues of fairness and justice. Reforms 
may be perceived as producing winners and losers, and finding the right social contract might 
not be easy, although some frameworks have been suggested (Myles, 2002).  
The post-communist countries have often opted for a multiple pillar system
10 as recommended 
by the World Bank (1994) in a report that was later widely criticised for unreasonably extolling 
the virtues of the funded component (Stiglitz & Orszag, 1999, p. 9, Barr, 2001, p. 101 and 
World Bank, 2006a). In Western Europe, the most radical overhaul of a pension system has 
been undertaken by Sweden, which introduced a notional defined contribution (NDC)
11 system 
in 1999 (and a small, mandatory funded component). NDC has proven to be a generally popular 
reform option, also applied in Latvia and Poland for their PAYG pillars and recently adopted in 
Italy. The World Bank published a study (2006b) that generally looks highly favourably on this 
type of pension scheme. 
                                                      
10 The first two pillars are mandatory. The first is a publicly organised PAYG scheme; the second consists 
of individual savings accounts administered by specially licensed pension companies, through which 
assets are invested in financial markets. The countries that have adopted this system are Hungary, Poland, 
Latvia, Estonia and the Slovak Republic (in chronological order by the date of starting the reform, from 
1998 to 2004). Lithuania has a similar system, but with a fully voluntary option to split contributions 
between the two tiers. The third pillar should consist of supplementary, voluntary pension-saving, but in 
none of these countries is this component of any significance yet. 
11 NDC has also been referred to as ‘non-financially defined contribution’ systems in the latest World 
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5.4  Reforming tax systems 
The wider issue of incentives to work and a management of entrepreneurial and labour market 
risk of course covers taxation. The recent interest in some forms of guaranteed minimum 
income (GMI) taxation regimes, as well as growing interest in negative income taxation (which 
is one way of realising the GMI), as well as public discussions on the flat-rate income tax 
should not be overlooked in social protection debate, since taxation should be seen as a more or 
less integral part of welfare regimes. 
A guaranteed minimum income is an idea that has been put forward by economists for a long 
time. It is based on an understanding of taxation as an incentive to work rather than the 
opposite. Under this concept, every individual in the society is entitled to a minimum income, 
whether s/he is in or out of work, thus avoiding the poverty trap. The minimum income replaces 
social transfers below this level. A standard tax rate is deducted at every source of income 
(Aglietta, 2000, pp. 444-45). The idea is usually associated with the Belgian economist Van 
Parijs, for whom it is directly related to the changing nature of work in the post-industrial age 
(Aglietta, 2000, p. 445). For this post-Keynesian approach, income should be seen as something 
separate from the nature of the individual job, owing to advances in collective productivity. The 
same instrument, however, is viewed in a different light by Aglietta, with work as the principal 
means of social integration. 
A related concept is the one of negative income tax, first put forward by Milton Friedman four 
decades ago (1963).  
Guaranteeing a certain minimum income as a way of reintegrating individuals into society is 
today being put on the agenda in countries that combine high unemployment with high labour 
costs. 
This trend in policy-making coincides with the debate on the flat-rate tax, although here the 
focus of the discussion seems to be on the higher income strata (although in principle a 
guaranteed minimum income and especially a negative income tax system is basically a flat-rate 
system). In academic circles, the debates were sparked by the publication of Hall & Rabushka’s 
The Flat Tax in 1985, re-published in 1995. More recently, the flat-rate personal income tax was 
introduced in four post-communist member states of the EU – Slovakia and the Baltic States 
(Slovakia is the only OECD country with this radical tax arrangement on a national scale). This 
move helped to bring the issue to wider attention in the European policy scene. In the last 
German general elections, the flat-rate personal income tax was associated with the Christian 
Democrats, when one of their economic experts strongly advocated it. Soon after the idea was 
floated in the UK by the Conservative Party.  
5.5  Poverty and the issue of the underclass 
Against the backdrop of discussions on the dismal performance of European labour markets, it 
is necessary to remember that the present unemployment is based on much higher participation 
rates than in the past. “Unlike before, we must now include women in the nation’s full 
employment promise” (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 1). Irregardless of the widespread discussion 
about the efficacy of the welfare state, which started right after the post-war boom waned by the 
early 1970s, social protection has become more, not less, widespread since then. 
Despite these advances, social protection challenges in Europe still include the old-fashioned 
issue of poverty. Absolute poverty has continued to decline practically uniformly across the EU 
and generally in the OECD countries in recent years, but relative poverty has been on the rise 
(Förster & d’Ercole, 2005). This development, again, is very much connected with problems in 
job creation (European Commission, 2005a, p. 5). Nevertheless, the issue of social exclusion 32 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
and, sometimes, the downright creation of an underclass, cuts across various other aspects of 
social policy, and especially relevant to it are education policies (Esping-Andersen, 2006).  
The problem of underclass might have some old-fashioned structural causes, but it manifests 
itself in many new ways. Many social risks are closely correlated with lifestyle habits. Examples 
include smoking or, in a post-scarcity society, overeating junk food. These habits are, in turn, 
closely correlated with social divisions (Giddens, 2005, p. 108). Obesity is usually the problem 
of the low-income strata and has become a serious issue, particularly in the UK, where 
legislative efforts are underway to ban junk food advertising.
12 Lifestyle policies are clearly 
becoming an important component of state intervention.  
5.6  Investing in the future – Childcare and schooling 
Childcare is crucial for women’s employment. Econometric evidence suggests that if the supply 
of childcare were to increase by 20 percentage points for countries such as Germany, Italy, 
Spain or the Netherlands, women’s employment could post a gain of as much as 10 percentage 
points (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 59). Childcare is indeed a crucial but often neglected aspect 
of social policies. The Barcelona European Council in the spring of 2003 addressed the issue by 
setting quantitative targets, aiming at providing childcare facilities for 90% of children aged 
between 3 years and the mandatory school age, and for 33% of children under three years old. 
The latter is very far from being attained in most EU countries. Initiatives could include ‘daddy 
days’ and ‘baby bonds’ (Ferrera, 2005, p. 33).  
Yet such EU-sponsored initiatives seem a tall order. “Child benefits and services are not 
mentioned at all in any of the objectives that guide the ‘open coordination’ processes” although 
it would seem natural to include childcare under social inclusion policies (ibid., p. 31).  
Adequate child benefits and services thus cut across the wider array of employment-cum-growth 
and social inclusion processes. And they seem directly pertinent to the issue of ‘adverse 
demographics’. The Scandinavian countries and France have relatively high birth rates, and 
these are precisely the countries that provide comprehensive benefits and services connected 
with childcare (Giddens, 2005, p. 112). 
At the same time, the issue of reforming European education (particularly university), systems 
to make them more globally competitive has also resonated in the public debate (Lambert & 
Butler, 2006). 
5.7 Reconceptualising the welfare state 
The prototypical client of the post-war, industrial welfare state was an unskilled or semi-skilled 
male manufacturing worker, often the sole breadwinner of the family. The main risk for the 
family was that the breadwinner would lose his job. The accent was therefore on job protection 
and income maintenance. Risks of poverty were mostly related to children in large families and 
people in old age. Hence policies aimed at providing family allowances and pensions. Lone 
motherhood, the risks associated with labour mobility, re-training needs, youth unemployment 
and long-term unemployment were never assumed. Life-course risks were mostly a simple 
question of consumption smoothing, with brief periods of unemployment covered by insurance. 
Inter-generational risks were deemed to be overcome by steadily rising productivity. 
New risks include de-skilled workers, the new underclass in a ‘two-speed society’, ‘welfare 
mothers’ and so on. 
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The social risk challenges can be formulated as issues of potential traps (Esping-Andersen, 
1999, p. 5). One is the ‘low-fertility equilibrium’ emerging from the pressure on women to 
combine career and family roles. Another is the potential ‘low-wage, low-skill equilibrium’ that 
may arise from extensive labour-market deregulation. Yet so far, it seems that the issue of de-
skilling has not been given a systematic, EU-wide analysis. 
There are two distinctively different strategic responses to the ‘equality/jobs trade-off’ (Soskice, 
1994). In ‘uncoordinated economies’, wage adjustments and weakened employee protection 
resulted in rising inequalities. This model seems particularly vulnerable to the low-skills 
equilibrium. On the other hand, ‘coordinated economies’ moved in the direction of high-quality, 
well-remunerated production that privileges the core, stable workforce of highly skilled and 
highly productive workers. The Nordic countries, of course, fall in between these two polar 
opposites. Not so long ago (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 152), some commentators were 
pronouncing the Scandinavian third way as ‘stranded’. Today, as we have seen, ‘the Nordic 
model’ seems to be the talk of the town again. 
How is Europe dealing with the new challenges? Different welfare regimes promote different 
institutionalised mindsets, which in turn produce different responses to social pressure. A simple 
but insightful story is told by Esping-Andersen, featuring three actors: Homo liberalismus, 
Homo familius and Homo socialdemocraticus (1999, pp. 170-74). In a similar vein, Held & 
Koenig-Archibugi (2003) have suggested four classes of respondents to globalisation: the 
sceptics  (who do not believe any significant changes are needed); the de-regulators (who 
believe the welfare state needs to be rolled back as a response to globalisation); the reversers 
(the anti-globalists who believe there is need to organise resistance to the phenomenon); and the 
internationalists (who believe an internationalisation of politics is needed to help deal with the 
adverse effects of economic liberalisation). 
The EU certainly has been developing a certain drive towards establishing some common 
aspects of social protection policy, which has also formed part of the Lisbon strategy (European 
Commission, 2005b). Key here is the expanding set of governance and meta-governance 
capacities, which are becoming increasingly salient despite the fact that formally the national 
states retain sovereignty in welfare state policies (Scharpf, 2002). These capacities arose out of 
the Union’s coordinating role for economic policies, and it is therefore perhaps not surprising 
that some commentators can note how “the emergence of social policy at the European level 
tends to assume a workfare rather than a welfare orientation” (Jessop, 2002, p. 207).  
The dominant tone of current policy-making at the European level is seen by some as “not so 
much social integration but rather the instrumentalisation of policy as a resource for competition 
oriented structural change” (Deppe, Felder & Titow, 2000). 
This policy direction seems to be partly the result of analysts and policy-makers being at a loss 
for solutions and shy about promoting any specific comprehensive policies. Thus, in the view of 
some commentators “the social dimension of the Lisbon agenda” for example, “has fallen into 
the hands of specialized circles of ‘insiders’”, and social justice is often just being paid lip 
service (Ferrera, 2005, p. 34). Anthony Giddens has stated this quite strongly: “Although the 
Lisbon Agenda, Sapir report, Kok report and other similar contributions all talk about the ESM 
[European social model], social exclusion and so on, they have little to say about them in a 
direct way. They lack a systematic discussion of how the innovations they propose can be 
reconciled with social justice and welfare” (Giddens, p. 103, emphasis in the original). He 
similarly criticises the Commission’s 2005 Communication on the Social Agenda for lack of 
analysis of “changing patterns of class, inequality and social division”. 
Giddens goes on to propose a positive welfare programme replacing the negative of Beveridge’s 
‘evils’: “In place of Want, personal autonomy; not avoidance of Disease, but active health; 34 | JURAJ DRAXLER 
 
instead of Ignorance, education, as a continuing part of life; rather than Squalor, prosperity; and 
in place of Idleness; initiative” (Giddens, 2005, p. 105). The state that he pictures is an agency 
underpinning paths to prosperity:  
Rather than the ‘welfare state’, we should speak of a society of positive welfare, in 
which the state plays a central, but not a dominating, role. The state is primarily a 
social investment and regulatory agency. Many over recent years have talked of the 
welfare state as an enabling force, but it is better to speak of the ensuring state in the 
positive welfare society. An ensuring state is one that enables – one that uses social 
investment whenever possible to help people to help themselves (ibid., p. 106). 
Europe has recently added significant policy tools for strengthening social protection, in 
addition to earlier structural and cohesion policies. With the advent of the economic and 
monetary union, the European Employment Strategy and other policies related to the Lisbon 
process such as the open method of coordination came into being. The most recent addition is 
the Globalisation Adjustment Fund. For some, as we have seen, this is not enough. Yet the 
Union undeniably has a social dimension. Despite the differences within the European social 
model, Begg & Berghman (2002) point out that it still entails shared values that make common 
approaches feasible. These values couple social norms with economic requirements. As Begg & 
Berghman (ibid., p. 183) state, the minimum wages and benefits established by EU member 
states implicitly set minimum productivity requirements. The European social model is alive but 
needs to deepen the dynamic approach to policies. From a life-course perspective, investing in 
the health and education of children contains social expenditures later on and creates a good 
framework for an effectively functioning market. “The focus on capabilities means that the 
state, as well as the market, must promote the development of each person’s capabilities to work 
in the context of that [which] a person values” (ibid., p. 185). 
6. Conclusions 
This literature review has attempted to sum up the main challenges facing policy-makers when 
responding to the pressures of globalisation.  
The paper has first pointed out that globalisation has many forms. Changing patterns of trade, 
investment and technological development can be captured quantitatively, but a degree of 
structural analysis is also needed, to identify the roles of the main actors in the relevant 
processes. Here, many authors point at the rising saliency of the multinational enterprise, as a 
symptom of globalisation as well as a driver of trade, investment and technological changes. 
Second, the paper has identified the range of theoretical issues involved in the conceptualisation 
of social protection for today’s world. It has highlighted recent contributions to the growing 
volume of literature on ‘social risk management’. This term denotes the understanding that the 
welfare of individuals is enhanced by the right mix of market and state-based risk-management 
mechanisms that go beyond the narrowly defined concept of social protection that dominated 
policy-making for most of the post-war era. That era has come to an end. Not only are we 
observing changes in the economic sphere, in which the large manufacturing operations based 
on a massified workforce employed in assembly-line work are becoming less and less 
significant. The social sphere is changing too. People no longer live predominantly in nuclear 
families, having children at a fairly predictable age, facing only transient problems with 
employment that are easily dealt with through unemployment insurance. In a society where a 
bad mix of skills can lead to lifelong poverty, premiums on good education and lifelong learning 
opportunities rise. Social risk management is closely related to the notion of social protection as 
a productive factor. The more effectively a society lets the individual manage his/her risks, the 
higher are the welfare gains for all. GLOBALISATION AND SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE | 35 
 
Third, the paper has listed some of the literature highlighting the link between or relevant to 
policies aiming at increasing ‘competitiveness’ and the impact on the welfare of individuals.  
Finally, the paper has summed up the concrete challenges for, and some of the most recent 
developments in, the sphere of social protection in Europe. 
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